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MATERIAL SOLUTIONS: RECTIFYING UNITED STATES V. 
NATALE AND THE MEANING OF “MATERIAL” 
 
Vaughn Bentley 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the summer of 2013, the United States Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals decided a case under a sparsely litigated statute, False Statements 
Relating to Health Care Matters, or § 1035. The appeal in the case, United 
States v. Natale, centered around the meaning of the term “material” as 
used in the statute. The Court ultimately decided the term covered post- 
operative surgical reports that had never been submitted for payment from 
Medicare. There was no planned audit of the surgeon, so it is likely Medi- 
care would never have seen the reports outside of this lawsuit. 
This ruling has significantly shifted what constitutes a “material 
statement” under § 1035. It also represents a departure from what has been 
found to be material in the past under the statute § 1035, and what § 1035 
was designed to mirror, § 1001. Moving forward, either the Seventh Cir- 
cuit or the Supreme Court should look to overrule this decision, either by 
using the meaning given by another Circuit or simply reverting back to the 
pre-Natale standard. Doing so will better protect surgeons and encourage 
detailed post-operative reports, leading to higher quality patient care. 
 
I. NATALE – JUST THE FACTS 
 
A. Introduction 
 
To fully understand the implications and reasons for the solutions 
proposed, it is important to understand both the factual and procedural his- 
tory of the Natale case. Due to the complicated surgical procedures in- 
volved1  and the highly technical proceedings,2 it is easy to get lost without 
 
 
1 This case involves two separate types of arterial grafts as well as a new technique for placing the grafts, as 
discussed infra. 
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fully appreciating the circumstances leading up to this ruling. This section 
will first go through the factual background of the case and second the 
procedural history of the case. 
 
B. Factual Background 
 
Dr. John Natale focused on repairing complex aortic aneurysms.3 
Repairing aortic aneurysms involves repairing the walls of the aorta, the 
main artery exiting the heart, and the associated arteries.4 These surgeries 
involve two types of grafts: tube or bifurcated.5 A tube graft is a synthetic 
tube, which replaces the weakened arterial wall.6 This graft is used when 
the section of the artery needing to be repaired does not branch out into il- 
iac arteries.7 A bifurcated graft is used when the arterial section does 
branch off.8 The bifurcated graft is a much more complex surgery because 
the bifurcated graft is shaped like an upside down “Y”.9 Renal grafts tend 
to be among the most complex aneurysm repairs due to the need to clamp 
the renal arteries and attach the branching iliac arteries to the synthetic 
graft rather than the natural artery.10 Natale was brought up on charges of 
performing simple artery grafts but using the CPT (current procedural 
terminology) codes for the more complex suprarenal aortic aneurysm.11 
 
C. Procedural History 
 
Natale was charged with two counts of health care fraud, one count 
of mail fraud, and two counts of making false statements relating to health 
care matters.12 The bases for these charges were discrepancies in Natale’s 
operative reports.13 Another surgeon treating a former patient of Natale’s 
found Natale had claimed in his report to have performed a bifurcated 
graft when a CT scan indicated a tube graft instead.14 Operative reports are 
 
 
2 This case also involves a highly technical appeal concerning what arguments could and could not be  
made, as discussed infra. 
3 See United States v. Natale, 719 F.3d 719, 722-23 (7th Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1875 (2014). 
4  Id. at 722. 
5 Id. 
6  Id. at 724. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9  Natale, 719 F.3d at 724. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. at 725. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. at 726-27. 
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generally used only by physicians in making post-operative treatment de- 
cisions and are not seen by Medicare during the billing process.15 During 
an audit, however, Medicare can request to review these documents.16 
Medicare never requested the reports in Natale and did not indicate there 
was any ongoing audit against Natale.17 
At trial, Natale presented evidence that he was using a technique 
the CPT codes did not recognize, which the Court termed the “Rush tech- 
nique.”18 This technique, which involved folding over the arterial walls 
when placing a tube graft, was more complex than the simple tube graft 
procedure and more in line with the complexity of a bifurcated graft.19 Na- 
tale was acquitted of the health care fraud and mail fraud charges, but 
found guilty on the false statements charge.20 Natale then appealed this de- 
cision based on jury instruction error.21 
 
II. WHAT “MATERIAL” DOES AND DOESN’T MEAN 
 
A. Introduction 
 
This case brought up two separate statutes: False Statements Relat- 
ing to Health Care Matters (§ 1035) and Statements or Entries Generally  
(§ 1001).22 Natale was charged and convicted under § 1035.23 Since this is 
not a widely litigated statute in the Seventh Circuit, the Court had to use 
the language and analysis of § 1001 to determine what the elements of § 
1035 are.24 This section will detail: (1) what § 1035 requires; (2) what § 
1001 requires; (3) the legislative history of § 1035; (4) what the Seventh 
Circuit in Natale claims “material” for the purposes of § 1035 requires; 
and (5) what other Circuit Courts have held “material” for the purpose of § 
1035 requires. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15  Natale, 719 F.3d at 727. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. at 728. 
19  Natale, 719 F.3d at 727-28. 
20  Id. at 728. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. at 733. 
23  Id. at 725. 
24  Id. at 732-33. 
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B. § 1035 – False Statements Relating to Health Care Matters 
 
Natale was specifically charged under § 1035(a)(2), which states 
“Whoever, in any matter involving a health care benefit program, know- 
ingly and willfully... makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statements or representations... in connection with the delivery of or pay- 
ment for health care benefits....”25 The court identified four elements re- 
quired for a conviction under § 1035: (1) a false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statement; (2) the statement is material; (3) the statement is knowingly and 
willfully made; and (4) the statement is made in connection with the deliv- 
ery of or payment for health care benefits.26 
Natale’s appeal primarily concerned the meaning of material and 
whom the statement is material to.27  The actual text of the statute is un-    
clear on the matter.28 The Court finds the statutory text provides two plau- 
sible definitions: (1) material to the health care benefit program or (2) ma- 
terial to the delivery.29 The statute is silent on what “material” actually 
means.30 Due to the lack of prior decisions in the Seventh Circuit and the 
ambiguity of § 1035, the Court turns to a similarly worded statute, § 1001,  
and the legislative history of §   1035.31 
 
C. § 1001 – Statements or Entries Generally 
 
The analogous statute the Court uses is § 1001(a)(2), which pun- 
ishes “... whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, 
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, 
knowingly and willfully... makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudu- 
lent statement or representation....”32 Unlike, § 1035, there is no ambiguity 
over whom the statements must be material to because § 1001 lacks the “in 
connection to...” language.33 The Court looks to this as a clue over which 
interpretation of § 1035 should prevail.34 
 
 
 
25  18 U.S.C.A. § 1035 (West 2014). 
26  Natale, 719 F.3d at 733. 
27  Id. at 735-39. 
28 See § 1035 (“materially false” does not provide clues as to whether the statement needs to be material to 
delivery or material to the program). 
29  Natale, 719 F.3d 719 at 735. 
30 See §1035 (no definitions provided besides “healthcare benefit program”). 
31  Natale, 719 F.3d at 735. 
32  18 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a)(2) (West, 2014). 
33 Compare § 1035 with § 1001 (§ 1035 adds in language over “in connection to...” to establish a jurisdic- 
tion). 
34  Natale, 719 F.3d 719 at 735-36. 
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The Court also looks to § 1001 for the definition of “materially.”35 
Generally, there are two ideas of interpretation for what “materially” in- 
cludes: (1) actual reliance and (2) natural tendency.36 “Actual reliance” re- 
fers to requiring the person or agency to actually rely on the statement.37 
“Natural tendency,” the view taken by the Court in Natale,38 refers to only 
requiring the statement have a “natural tendency to influence, or be capa- 
ble of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it 
was addressed.”39 This generally mirrors what most circuits have held, the 
statement or fact does not need to actually influence the agency, it must 
only be capable of doing so.40 For example, a false statement made to a 
grand jury only needs to be able to influence the grand jury’s decision, not 
necessarily exert any influence. The Court does not hold this to be disposi- 
tive, however, and goes on to consider the legislative history of § 1035.41 
 
D. Legislative History of § 1035 
 
At first, § 1035 had no “material” requirement.42  After the bill left   
the House, the Senate added in the material language,43  which mirrored § 
1001.44 It was not until the Conference Committee added the “in connec- 
tion  with”  and  “materially”  language  in  the  present  version  both  ap- 
peared.45 The Conference Committee  pulled  the  “materially”  language  
from the Senate version of the bill,46 so the court in Natale attaches this 
meaning so the statements must be “material to a health care program”.47 
 
 
35  Natale, 719 F.3d 719 at 735. 
36  United States v. Lupton, 620 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2010). 
37  Id. 
38  Natale, 719 F.3d at 735. 
39  Lupton, 620 F.3d at 806. 
40 See United States v. Notarantonio, 758 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d 
Cir. 1985); United States v. Puente, 982 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Dedhia, 134 F.3d 802 
(6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Keller, 730 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ill. 1990); United States v. Baker, 200 F.3d 
558 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 
1071 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Grizzle, 933 F.2d 943 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pereira,  
463 F. Supp. 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); (all using this definition of material for § 1001). 
41  Natale, supra note 1, at 736-37. 
42 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, H.R. 3103, 104th Cong, § 244(a) (1996) (as 
passed by the House on Mar. 28, 1996). 
43 H.R. 3031, 104th Cong. § 544(a) (as amended and enacted by the Senate on Apr. 23, 1996). 
44 Compare H.R. 3031, 104th Cong. § 544(a) (as amended and enacted by the Senate on Apr. 23, 1996) 
(“[I]n any matter involving a health care program, knowingly and willfully... makes any materially false, 
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation”) with § 1001(a)(2) (“[W]hoever, in any matter within 
the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government... knowingly and will- 
fully... makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation”). 
45  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at 259 (1996). 
46  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-736, at 259 (1996). 
47  Natale, 719 F.3d at 737. 
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E. “Materiality” According to the Court 
 
The Court claims to adopt the same meaning of “material” present 
in § 1001 for § 1035.48 Once applied, however, the difference becomes 
clear. Natale never had to submit his operative reports to Medicare, and 
Medicare made no indication they ever would have asked for them.49 This 
is a departure from what the court has done with § 1001 in the past. The 
court, in the cases it cites and other cases in the Circuit, has required the 
agency to actually receive the statement.50 This has never been  explicit, 
but is instead a unifying theme in the cases.51 Natale represents a departure 
from not only what the Seventh Circuit has held, but also what every other 
Circuit Court has held.52 
 
F. Other Circuits Views 
 
Other circuits have generally agreed actual reliance is not a re- 
quirement for a statement to be “material.”53 The Third Circuit has taken a 
holistic view, requiring the court to look at the entirety of the circum- 
stances.54 The Fifth Circuit looks to whether the functioning of an agency 
would be materially affected to determine materiality.55 The Fourth Circuit 
has read in a requirement of submission without actual reliance, essentially 
the naturalistic view from § 1001.56 
 
 
48  Natale, 719 F.3d at 737. 
49  Id. at 727. 
50 See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988); United States v. Lupton, 620 F.3d 790, 806 (7th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Turner, 551 F.3d 657, 663 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gully, 992 F.2d 108 
(7th Cir. 1993); United States v. DiFonzio, 603 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1979);). 
51  Id. 
52 See United States v. Notarantonio, 758 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Pereira, 463 F. Supp.  
481 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Arch Trading 
Co., 987 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Puente, 982 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Dedhia, 134 F.3d 802 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Keller, 730 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ill. 1990); United 
States v. Baker, 200 F.3d 558 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1979);  
United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Grizzle, 933 F.2d 943 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(all requiring submission of a claim implicitly to constitute “material” under § 1001). 
53 See United States v. Notarantonio, 758 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Pereira, 463 F. Supp.  
481 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Puente, 982 
F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Dedhia, 134 F.3d 802 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Keller,  
730 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ill. 1990); United States v. Baker, 200 F.3d 558 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Valdez, 594 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Grizzle, 933 F.2d 943 (11th Cir. 1991) (all using this definition of material for § 1001). 
54 United States v. Quirk, 167 F. Supp. 462 (D.C. Pa. 1958), aff’d 266 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1958). 
55  United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1975). 
56 United States v. Newton, 452 F. APP’X 288 (4th Cir. 2011) (evidence of submission of a statement that 
was false and had capacity to influence was sufficient for a conviction under § 1001(a)(2)). 
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The Fifth Circuit has taken the most liberal view, at least until Na- 
tale, in allowing for the statement to be ignored, never read, or even unbe- 
lievable.57 However, implicit in this decision is the submission of the 
statement to the agency. The statement can be ignored or never read, but it 
must still be submitted.58 The Sixth Circuit has also set the bar relatively 
low, but still requires the statement to be “made,” or submitted to the 
agency.59 While the Natale decision could be seen to be in line with these 
decisions on a cursory look, it has cause a large shift in no longer requiring 
submission of the claim. The “capable of influence” requirement under the 
natural tendency test has been expanded to include any statement with the 
remote chance of influencing the agency. 
 
III. HOW NATALE CHANGES THE GAME 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Natale has the potential for wide-reaching effects in health care. 
This decision broadens the “material” requirement of § 1035 in such a way 
as to open the door to more litigation in the future. This section details 
how the Natale decision can have potential effects on four areas: (1) the 
meaning of “material” under § 1035; (2) the meaning of “material”   under 
§ 1001; (3) discouraging detailed reports following surgery, lessening pa- 
tient care; and (4) increasing the number of qui tam actions brought under 
the False Claims Act. 
 
B. Potential Effects of the Current Rule on § 1035 
 
Natale has the biggest potential for an effect on § 1035 litigation in 
the Seventh Circuit. Since the court found non-submission sufficient for 
conviction,60 they have widened the breadth of § 1035. While this most 
obviously affects post-operative reports, it also reaches to any documenta- 
tion Medicare can request, even if they do not require the documentation 
for payment. For example, according to the Medicare billing rules, a teach- 
ing surgeon must be present during key portions of the surgery.61 For a 
single surgery, the teaching surgeon’s presence may be demonstrated in 
 
 
 
57  United States v. Abrahem, 678 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2012). 
58  Id. 
59  United States v. White, 270 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2001). 
60  Natale, 719 F.3d at 727. 
61  12 Medicare Billing Rules § 100.1.2(A). 
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the medical records.62 The teaching surgeon is not required to enter in any 
information, however.63 It is not hard to imagine a situation where a teach- 
ing surgeon is incorrectly noted as present through the entire surgery for 
the sake of time. Under the Natale standard, this could lead to a conviction 
for whoever prepared the report. Even if the surgeon was present for the 
key portions of the surgery, the fact that he was not present during any 
portion could be seen as material to the payment of the claim. This is espe- 
cially true if the time the teaching surgeon was absent is on the cusp of be- 
ing considered a key portion of the surgery. 
 
C. Potential Effects of the Current Rule on § 1001 
 
The rule under Natale can potentially reach farther than just § 
1035. Since the court drew so heavily on what “material” means in § 
1001,64 this could signal a change in how the court will view “material” in 
§ 1001 litigation. If the court adopts the standard from Natale into § 1001 
litigation, the scope of § 1001 will be greatly broadened. Since under the 
Natale standard, submission of the statement is not required, an individual 
who plans on lying to any branch of the government, but does not, could 
be convicted under § 1001. While the government would still need to learn 
of the planned lie, with recent data breaches this is not unfathomable.65 
Even though the Natale standard as applied to § 1001 is only dicta, it 
should still be considered when looking to change the meaning. 
 
D. Potential Effects of the Current Rule on Patient Care 
 
The current ruling discourages physicians to be specific in post- 
operative reports, which could lead to a lower quality of care for the pa- 
tient. Natale claimed the discrepancies in his reports were the result of how 
many patients he saw and being careless.66 While one potential upside of 
the ruling could be increased care in these reports, the more likely outcome 
will be surgeons being as vague as possible. This was, in fact, argued in 
various amicus briefs filed in the Natale case.67 The court claims the intent 
 
 
62  Id. at § 100.1.2(A)(1). 
63  Id. 
64  See Id. at 735-36. 
65 See generally WIGGIN AND DANA, http://www.wiggin.com/15520 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Anthony 
Brino, Security Experts Warn of Increasing Data Breaches and Privacy Risks, GOVERNMENT HEALTH IT 
(Nov. 26, 2012), available at http://www.govhealthit.com/news/underwriting-experts-warn-increasing- 
data-breaches-and-privacy-risks (data breaches have been increasing in number over recent years). 
66  Natale, 719 F.3d at 738 
67  Id. at 739. 
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requirement in § 1035 would be a shield against such a result.68 Consider- 
ing the uptrend in qui tam cases69 and the penalties of conviction under § 
103570, surgeons should not view this as such. Innocent mistakes may not 
be believed to be such by the jury. Surgeons in areas of expertise that are 
in particularly high demand, who must see high numbers of  patients, 
should view this as a reason to take notes that are much more vague. Do- 
ing otherwise is to risk indictment as a result of poor paperwork. 
By discouraging these reports to be specific, patient care could suf- 
fer. Since the reports are primarily used to guide post-operative treat- 
ment,71 from a patient-care standpoint they should be as detailed as possi- 
ble. A detailed report can guide a physician who has a high volume of 
patients, or better yet assist a new physician if the old physician is no 
longer available. The Natale rule places patient-care and physician safety 
at odds with each other. 
 
E. Potential Effects of the Current Rule on Qui Tam Actions 
 
This could also have the effect of increasing the number of qui tam 
actions filed. The Supreme Court has already acknowledged the primary 
motivation for qui tam suits is financial.72 The case in Natale was brought 
by a competing surgeon,73 and taken in light of the financial motivation, 
could be seen as a surgeon wishing to take a competitor out of the market. 
Under a pre-Natale ruling, surgeons would be safe so long as they were 
not in violation of other fraud statutes, such as the False Claims Act or 
Anti-Kickback Statute. Now, if a surgeon notices any discrepancies in an- 
other’s post-operative reports, they can bring a qui tam action which could 
 
 
68  Id. 
69 See generally Beverly Cohen, KABOOM! The Explosion of Qui Tam False Claims Under Health Reform 
Law, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 77 (2011); Brian C. Betner et al., DOJ Announces That 2014 Sees Record FCA 
Recoveries and Whistleblower Lawsuits, LEXOLOGY (November 22, 2014), available at 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=44b942c1-557b-44a1-aeda- 
5da92574821d&utm_source=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed&utm_medium=HTML+email+-+Body+- 
+Federal+section&utm_campaign=Chicago+Bar+Association+subscriber+daily+feed&utm_content=Lexol 
ogy+Daily+Newsfeed+2014-11-27&utm_term; Scott Becker, JD, CPA & Molly Gamble, The Growth of 
Healthcare Fraud Qui Tam Lawsuits, BECKER’S HOSPITAL REVIEW (November 26, 2013), 
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legal-regulatory-issues/the-growth-of-healthcare-fraud-qui-tam- 
lawsuits.html; Kathy B. Weinman & Jennifer M. Ryan, Qui Tam Actions Against Pharmaceutical Compa- 
nies, COLLORA LLP http://www.collorallp.com/law-articles/white-collar/qui-tam-pharmaceutical.aspx (last 
visited Dec.18, 2014) (all supporting the idea that qui tam actions have increased and will continue to in- 
crease under the False Claims Act). 
70 Conviction under § 1035 is a felony with a maximum penalty of 5 years in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 1035. 
71  Natale, 719 F.3d at 738. 
72 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997) (“[Qui tam relators] are moti- 
vated primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather than the public good.”). 
73  Natale, 719 F.3d at 727. 
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result in a conviction under § 1035. The qui tam action does not even need 
to succeed, as it will still tie the physician up in costly litigation and slan- 
der the surgeon’s name. This motivates surgeons to bring potentially frivo- 
lous qui tam suits at an even more alarming rate. 
This motivation may be strengthened in light of recent legislation 
and litigation. In Illinois, the House of Representatives is considering 
amending The Department of Professional Regulation Law of the Civil 
Administrative Code of Illinois to streamline the revocation of    physician 
licenses in cases of Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse.74          Under this 
amendment, any physician convicted of a crime falling under Medicare 
Fraud and Abuse, will automatically lose his or her license.75 This elimi- 
nates the administrative process to determine whether the physician will 
lose his license,76 which can result in a settlement without loss of license.77 
Competing surgeons will now have a stronger incentive to turn in physi- 
cians under this law, as it will result in less competition if a qui tam action 
succeeds. 
In Illinois, this incentive is only strengthened when considered in 
light of recent cases. Judge Flaum of the Seventh Circuit broadened the 
reach of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) in a recent decision.78 In Patel, 
the Seventh Circuit reasoned even a certification or re-certification for care 
would be considered a referral for the purposes of AKS.79 This greatly 
broadened the reach of AKS, to now apply virtually any time a physician 
receives money from a hospital, even if the physician does not direct pa- 
tients to the hospital.80 While this decision could be deserving of a com- 
ment of its own, it is worth noting Judge Flaum seems intent on further 
expanding the reach of fraud and abuse statutes. 
This expansion is troubling for surgeons when considered in light 
of Hayashi v. Illinois Deptartment of Financial and Professional Regula- 
tion. In Hayashi, a group of physicians had their licenses suspended after 
they were convicted of battery or sexual abuse offenses.81 The court in 
Hayashi held a statute enacted after the physicians’ conviction    providing 
 
 
74  H.R. 1359, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2015). 
75  Id. 
76  Id. 
77  68 Admin § 1285.225. 
78 United States v. Patel, No. 14-2607 (7th Cir. Feb. 10, 2015), available at 
http://www.healthlawpolicymatters.com/files/2015/02/Patel-7th-Cir2015-02-10.pdf (Judge Flaum also de- 
cided Natale). 
79  Id. at 23. 
80  Id. at 19. 
81  Hayashi v. Illinois Dept. of Financial and Professional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 5-9 (Oct. 17,  
2014). 
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for automatic loss of license was still applicable to the physicians.82 The 
court found the language of the statute, that a physician “has been con- 
victed,” made the statute applicable.83  The court further held this was not  
a retroactive statute, meaning it passed constitutional muster.84 Since the 
proposed bill in the house has similar language to the statute in Hayashi,85 
it is not much of a stretch for the Illinois courts to find the proposed statute 
will apply to any physician licensed in Illinois who has ever been con- 
victed of a Medicare or Medicaid fraud crime. This includes those under § 
1035. This gives surgeons a very strong incentive to bring even more qui 
tam actions, as their competitors could permanently lose their license even 
if this legislation is passed after the competitors’ conviction. 
 
IV. SOLUTIONS 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The current standard for materiality under Natale is too broad. As 
it stands, a qui tam suit could unearth documents that lead to a separate 
conviction even when the qui tam action fails.86 By not requiring a state- 
ment to be submitted to Medicare, only the possibility of submission,   the 
court has created a lot of vulnerability for physicians that did not exist be- 
fore. 
The Seventh Circuit may be unlikely to act, however, as they de- 
nied a rehearing en banc in Natale. This potentially represents the judges 
support this view and are unlikely to overturn the case in the foreseeable 
future. However, they may also be waiting for a case with facts better 
suited for clarifying the ruling. Similar problems exist within the Supreme 
Court, as certiorari was denied in the Natale case. The Supreme Court 
may simply be waiting for more input from the circuits on the differences 
between § 1035 and § 1001 and how materiality should be reflected in 
each. Since § 1035 is sparsely litigated, it may be some time before either 
court has the opportunity to rehear the issues present in Natale. 
Either the Seventh Circuit or the Supreme Court can correct this 
ruling by clarifying or overruling Natale. Congress can amend the lan- 
 
 
82  Id. at ¶ 52. 
83  Id. at ¶ 19. 
84  Id. at ¶ 26. 
85 Compare Ill. H.B. 1359 (“...has been adjudicated”) with Hayashi, 2014 IL 116023 at ¶ 17 (“...has been 
convicted”). 
86  See generally Cohen, supra note 69; Brian C. Betner, supra note 69 (all supporting the idea that qui  tam 
actions have increased and will continue to increase under the False Claims Act). 
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guage of the statutes in play as well. There are five possible solutions: (1) 
a rule based on the Fourth Circuit view; (2) a rule based on the Third Cir- 
cuit view; (3) revert back to the pre-Natale rule; (4) a new rule better re- 
flecting the requirements of § 1035; or (5) Congress can clarify the mean- 
ing of material within § 1035 and § 1001. 
 
B. Rule Based On The Fourth Circuit 
 
The Fourth Circuit has articulated a standard that would preserve 
the pre-Natale view of the seventh circuit while still maintaining the idea 
the statement must be submitted to the agency. In United States v. Newton, 
the court broke down conviction under § 1001 into three elements: (1) the 
defendant made a false statement to a government agency; (2) the defen- 
dant acted knowingly and willfully; and (3) the statement was material.87 
This breakdown has survived recent litigation as well.88 
By separating submission of the statement from materiality, the 
court could allow for the traditional “natural tendency” to stand while still 
upholding the idea that submission is required. This give the  court the 
most discretion to further shape the meaning of “material” and expand 
upon this meaning while not having to worry about balancing the “natural 
tendency” test with submission. This action should be attractive to the Su- 
preme Court if they do not trust the lower courts to be able to adequately 
balance the two in the future. Since this removes submission from consid- 
eration and instead draws the bright line rule, it would be most attractive to 
those who want to decrease the number of actions brought against sur- 
geons. From a public policy standpoint, creating a bright line standard 
would not allow for much change outside of amending the statute. While 
this does reign in judges who may wish to legislate from the bench, it may 
not reflect future situations. These considerations should be taken into ac- 
count when shaping a rule from the Supreme Court. 
Ruling this way would also encourage surgeons to keep filling out 
the post operative reports as they have been. By requiring submission of 
the reports to constitute criminal activity, the court is keeping the status 
quo. Rather than having the courts change this standard, leave it to CMS or 
Congress to require submission of the reports for payment, rather than  
only requesting them in an audit. This avoids issues of judicial activism 
 
 
 
87  Newton, 452 F. APP’X at 291-92. 
88 See United States v. Hamilton, 699 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2012) (not overturning or limiting Newton even 
when the circuit had the opportunity). 
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and allows surgeons the peace of mind to know whether these post- 
operative reports will likely be seen. 
 
C. Rule Based On The Third Circuit 
 
The courts could adopt the view from the Third Circuit. The Third 
Circuit uses a holistic view when evaluating materiality to determine if the 
statement would pass the natural tendency test.89 The court has taken the 
view of looking at the potential effects of the statement.90 For situations 
factually similar to Natale, where the agency never requests the statement 
and cannot show they were planning on requesting the statement, this 
would logically lead to the statement being “immaterial.” Since the agency 
cannot show the statements had the effect of being capable of influencing 
a decision unless requested, the statements cannot be material. 
This would allow courts to balance the competing interests at play. 
The government could still bring actions while the surgeons would be pro- 
tected from conviction for reports the agency may never request. Instead, 
the court would balance the two by taking a holistic view. By not drawing 
a bright line between “submission” and “non-submission,” the court re- 
tains discretion to whether the statements were likely to be requested. For 
example, if the agency could show they were in the process of auditing or 
the surgeon had a very high likelihood of an audit the reports could be 
considered “material.” This rule would provide the best result for the gov- 
ernment, the surgeons, and the court itself. 
 
D. Revert Back To The Old Rule 
 
Either the Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit could simply re- 
vert back to the pre-Natale standard, which implicitly requires submission 
of the claim. This, however, leaves the door open to future unrest. By mak- 
ing the requirement of submission only implied, future courts are able to 
reinstate the Natale standard. The court should only look to this option if 
they are unsure whether the Fourth Circuit or third circuit would better suit 
the purpose of § 1035. 
This is the most realistic change from the Seventh Circuit. The 
court would not be completely changing the standard, instead only overrul- 
ing one case. However, if the Supreme Court were to get involved, they 
 
 
89  Quirk, 167 F. SUPP. at 462. 
90 See United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1992) (court looked to how defendant’s statements to 
the FBI could have influenced the FBI agents to redirect their attention for § 1001 conviction). 
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may want more guidance for the lower courts. The pre-Natale standard in 
the seventh circuit was very vague and open-ended. The court may see this 
as being too open-ended and not advocating for the best interests of the 
surgeons. Considering the Supreme Court has already denied certiorari in 
the Natale case, it is very unlikely the court will seek to establish the pre- 
Natale standard. Instead, they are more likely to use the Natale standard or 
the standard from another circuit. 
 
E. New Rule Better Reflecting § 1035 
 
If the courts are the ones to fix this problem, they should imple- 
ment a rule that takes the best pieces of each circuit. Adopting this rule 
would account for the policy implications of each rule and work best to 
counteract the downsides of each. This rule would separate out submission 
from the “material” requirement, as done in the Fourth Circuit,91 while us- 
ing a balance test to determine whether a statement is material, as seen in 
the Third Circuit.92 If submission were a requirement that could only be 
overcome by a strong showing of materiality of the statement, the court 
best balances the interests of the surgeons and the government. 
The surgeons’ interests are served by this rule as submission of a 
statement is separated out from whether a statement is considered material. 
This allows surgeons to continue filling out post-operative reports as they 
have been. Only if audited would the surgeons be liable for the informa- 
tion in the reports. In this case, simple mistakes are less likely to lead to 
convictions, as they may have in this case. 
By using a balance test, the government can be assured if a state- 
ment is truly material it will lead to a conviction. For example, overcom- 
ing the submission requirement by showing the surgeon would have been 
audited would allow the government to proceed in cases otherwise dis- 
missed for a technicality. While this approach does lead to both the sur- 
geons and the government only having part of their interests served, it is a 
compromise each side should look to make. 
This court solution does the most to serve the interests of public 
policy. By blunting the potential effects of the rule in Natale, the courts 
can create good will with the public, reduce their own dockets, and limit 
liability for all other industries. 
This rule separates “material” from the submission requirement. 
Doing so can blunt the effects the current rule could have on patient   care. 
 
 
91  Newton, 452 F. APP’X at 291-92. 
92  Quirk, 167 F. Supp. at 462. 
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Since physicians will not be as enticed to be vague in the post-operative 
reports, patient-care could improve, or at least remain the same. This kind 
of effect has the potential to create a great deal of good will with the pub- 
lic. However, surgeons will still not be incentivized to lie in post- 
operative reports. CMS can still request the reports in an audit, and creat- 
ing a balancing test where a strong showing of materiality can overrule the 
need for submission will still allow the government to bring suits without 
fear of losing on a technicality. 
A rule separating the material and submission requirements will 
not incentivize qui tam actions by other surgeons. Since qui tam actions 
are already expected to increase,93 the current rule may lead to large dock- 
ets for the federal courts and large case-loads for the Attorney General’s 
Office with potentially no trade-off. As discussed supra, surgeons will be 
incentivized to bring frivolous lawsuits against other surgeons. Such law- 
suits take up valuable time and assets of the surgeon being charged and the 
federal government, who may investigate the case before discovering it is 
frivolous. Such suits should be discouraged, as the proposed rule does. 
Finally, this rule limits liability for all industries governed by § 1001. As 
discussed supra, the current Natale rule may expand liability for § 1001. 
Since § 1001 governs all industries, and even criminal trials, the current 
rule expands liability for all by never requiring submission for a statement 
to be material. A criminal defendant who writes plans to lie in testimony, 
going so far as to write the testimony down, but ultimately tells the truth 
may be found in violation of § 1001 under Natale. A rule limiting this li- 
ability is in the obvious interest of everyone. 
 
F. Amendment to the Act by Congress 
 
Finally, Congress could pass an amendment, clarifying the mean- 
ing of material in § 1035. This solution would be the most effective, as the 
Supreme Court has refused to speak on the issue94 and the circuits are cur- 
rently split on the issue.95          This would be the first time § 1035 has been 
 
 
 
93 See D. Michael Crites, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Increases Potency of Qui Tam Suits 
Under the False Claims Act, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Aug. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/patient-protection-and-afforable-care-act-increases-potency-qui-tam- 
suits-under-false-claims. 
94 See United States v. Natale, 134 S. Ct. 1875 (2014) (denying petition for certiorari). 
95 Compare Natale 719 F.3d 719 (holding there is no submission requirement for a statement to be consid- 
ered “material”), with Newton, 452 F. APP’X 288 (holding submission is a separate requirement entirely 
from “material”), and Quirk, 167 F. SUPP. 462 (holding the appropriate test is a balancing test to determine 
if submission is required for a statement to be “material”). 
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amended since it’s inception in 1996.96 Congress should look to add a 
definition of “material” clearly establishing submission of a statement as a 
separate requirement from whether a statement is “material” absent ex- 
traordinary factors. This definition would carry all of the advantages of  
the rule of suggested supra in section V(E), but additional advantages as 
well. 
The law should be amended to read: 
(c) As used in this section, the term “material” means “a 
statement that has the natural tendency to influence, or be 
capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking 
body to which it was addressed.” A statement can only be 
considered material if it has been submitted to the deci- 
sionmaking body, absent extraordinary circumstances. 
This structure follows the definition for “health care benefit program” 
within § 1035 without requiring an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 24, which 
the “health care benefit program” references. By not changing the defini- 
tion under § 24, titled “Definitions relating to Federal health care offense,” 
Congress can blunt the effect of their change.  If Congress were to  amend 
§ 24 to this reading, it would also change the meaning for any statute con- 
taining “material” for federal health care offenses. This could have unin- 
tended consequences, altering the meaning of statutes which are not beg- 
ging for the same changes. 
Another key advantage of this amendment is that it would settle 
the circuit split. Since the Supreme Court has declined to take action, this 
may be the only hope to avoid different standards across the country. Cur- 
rently, a cardiologist who performs grafts in both Southern Illinois and 
Missouri may  find  himself  facing  separate  standards.97  This  situation  is 
not  far  off,  considering  the  economic  realities  of  the  areas.98       Congress 
should seek to avoid this issue for obvious reasons. 
Finally, Congress is leaving some room open for the courts for in- 
terpretation. By not setting the limits on “extraordinary circumstances,” 
Congress leaves the courts room to sort out the intricacies.  This allows the 
 
 
96 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (2013), with 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (1996) (there are no changes in the statutory 
language). 
97 Illinois is in the Seventh Circuit while Missouri is in the Fifth Circuit. 
98 See Joanna Ganning et al., Southern Illinois Income and Employment, DEPT. OF URBAN AND REGIONAL 
PLANNING & DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES AT UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, available at 
http://research.aces.illinois.edu/sites/research.aces.illinois.edu/files/SIRAP/final/IncomeandEmployment.pd         
f (last visited February 27, 2015); Demographics, KIRKSVILLE REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INC., 
http://www.k-redi.com/demographics/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (the median income in Southern Illinois 
is $ 30,3846 and the median income in Northeast Missouri is $33,639). 
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courts to decide on a case-by-case basis what will overcome the require- 
ment of submission. Congress would still be limiting the court by using  
the phrase “extraordinary circumstances.” The plain meaning of  this 
phrase would suggest it requires more than the fact the statement could 
have been asked for. Instead, it would seemingly require evidence of an 
upcoming audit or similar circumstances. Placing these kinds of com- 
ments in the committee report would help solidify these requirements. 
The downside of relying on an amendment is that Congress must 
act. Based on recent years, Congress is not likely to pass any law soon.99 
Further, this would limit the amount of money the Federal government 
could reclaim for the Medicare trust. If the AARP or another lobbying 
group for the elderly were to get word of this, the law would likely fail.100 
Cuts to Medicare have not been politically popular in recent years with ei- 
ther the Democrats or Republicans.101 Since this would limit the ability of 
the federal government to re-collect money from Medicare, it may be seen 
in the same light. The only group in clear support of this change would by 
the American Medical Association, the American Cardiology Association, 
and American Surgical Association. However, these three groups would 
have a great deal of political pushback to overcome. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit, or Congress should look 
to correct the error from Natale by adopting the fourth circuit view. Doing 
so will allow the courts to shape what “material” means while still requir- 
ing the submission of a claim. The most likely rule for the Supreme Court 
to adopt would be from the Third Circuit, which takes a holistic view. This 
allows the court discretion and does not have the same bright line submis- 
sion requirement the fourth circuit does. The best rule for either court to 
 
 
99 See Philip Bump, The 113th Congress is Historically Good at Not Passing Bills, THE WASHINGTON POST 
(July 9, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/07/09/the-113th- 
congress-is-historically-good-at-not-passing-bills/ (the 113th Congress passed the fewest number of laws 
since 1973 and there has been a general downward trend since the 95th Congress in 1979). 
100 Older individuals are more likely to vote than younger and AARP is the largest lobbying group in the 
United States. Further, the AARP made a great deal of money by opposing Medicare Cuts in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. See Robert H. Binstock, PhD, Older People and Voting Participation: 
Past and Future, 40 THE GERONTOLOGIST, NO. 1, 18 (2000); Avik Roy, How the AARP Made $2.8 Billion 
by Supporting Obamacare’s Cuts to Medicare, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2012 12:13am), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/09/22/the-aarps-2-8-billion-reasons-for-supporting-obamacares- 
cuts-to-medicare/. 
101 Sandy Fitzgerald, Democrats Joining Republicans in Protest Over Medicare Advantage  Cuts,  
NEWSMAX (Apr. 6, 2014 5:36pm), available at http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/medicare-advantage- 
cuts-oppose/2014/04/06/id/563935/. 
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adopt is the rule proposed in this paper. The Seventh Circuit could also 
simply overrule Natale and revert back to the pre-Natale standard. Finally, 
Congress could amend the statute to clarify the meaning of material. Over- 
all, something must be done to shield surgeons from the ruling under Na- 
tale. 
